Recent developments in Saudi–US relations, particularly coinciding with Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington, show that an equation once defined merely by economics and energy has now expanded into far more complex layers of security, technology and geopolitics. Riyadh’s announcement of a $1tn investment in the US economy, its agreement to purchase advanced F-35 fighter jets, and the start of talks on nuclear cooperation mark a turning point in bilateral relations—one whose regional consequences, especially for Gulf security and the balance of power in West Asia, cannot be ignored.
Although these developments outwardly appear to represent an “economic pivot” toward diversifying Saudi Arabia’s economy and attracting technological investment, they in fact contain a more significant dimension: a heightened level of Riyadh’s strategic dependency on Washington in military, security and technological spheres. From the US perspective, these agreements form a new link in its chain of regional geopolitical containment; from the Saudi perspective, they represent a step toward securing security guarantees and entering the regional order envisioned by Washington.
What requires caution and strategic attention, however, is the impact of this trajectory on the collective security equation in the Persian Gulf and on the role of regional actors.
First, Saudi Arabia’s purchase of F-35 fighter jets—though publicly touted as a major military achievement—will in practice push Riyadh’s strategic dependency on US-controlled maintenance, repair, training and software infrastructure to an irreversible stage. The experience of other F-35 purchaser states shows that real control of these weapons does not lie with the buyer but remains embedded within the Pentagon’s supervisory and software architecture. This is a point regional strategic analysts should not overlook.
Second, the prospect of US–Saudi nuclear cooperation—under a so-called “peaceful programme”—naturally raises serious questions about safety standards, transparency and the extent of US access to Saudi Arabia’s fuel cycle. Any nuclear cooperation with a country simultaneously engaged in regional security rivalries will, inevitably, affect the sensitive equations of “asymmetric deterrence” in the Persian Gulf. If such cooperation serves as a cover for establishing a new US-led security–technical pillar, its consequences will not remain merely technical; they will be directly security-related.
Third, Mohammed bin Salman’s explicit reference to his willingness to join the Abraham Accords must be viewed alongside these recent economic–military agreements. Saudi Arabia is drawing closer to a new architecture that—if insufficient attention is paid to America’s expansionist objectives—may end up serving US and Israeli interests far more than its own. While this trajectory carries short-term benefits for Riyadh, in the long run it will not align with the real interests of the peoples of the region—from Palestine to the Persian Gulf. Excessive reliance on external pacts always carries the risk of losing strategic autonomy, a phenomenon repeatedly evident in the region’s history.
Fourth, Saudi Arabia’s $1tn investment in the United States—although part of Riyadh’s “Vision 2030” and its economic restructuring—will, in effect, inject unprecedented capital into the US economy, giving Washington the opportunity to use these resources as tools of leverage, pressure and regional steering. Large-scale foreign investments, if made without the backing of independent security–economic structures, can easily turn into insecure forms of dependency.
In sum, what is unfolding in Saudi–US relations is not merely an economic or military deal; it is part of the blueprint for a new regional power architecture. The principal architect remains the United States, while Saudi Arabia plays the role of an expensive partner—not necessarily one with independent decision-making power. Regional states, especially those that emphasize independence and indigenous security, must carefully monitor this trajectory, as these agreements could soon crystallize into a new model of “dependent security”—a model that, while promising development on the surface, restricts national decision-making power at its core.
Sustainable security in the Persian Gulf has never emerged from external pacts or locked-down weapons systems. The future of the region depends on endogenous cooperation, regional dialogue, and a responsible balance that grows from the independent policies of regional governments—not from designs drafted in Washington.
NOURNEWS