Underestimation prevents a clear understanding of the threat and hinders preparation of effective tools to mitigate its consequences. Exaggeration, on the other hand, drives society into despair and passivity. The middle path combines realism, confidence in national resilience, and strengthened diplomatic initiative.
Iran’s nuclear file has once again reached a sensitive juncture. The three European states—France, Germany, and Britain—have set a one-month deadline, warning that if no tangible progress is made in the talks, they will activate the snapback mechanism. This mechanism entails the automatic reinstatement of previous UN Security Council resolutions, placing Iran under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—a stage that, though repeatedly invoked by diplomats since 2018, now appears closer to reality than ever.
Two Opposite Risks
Some domestic analysts argue that the snapback mechanism will not have any concrete effect on Iran’s current situation. They reason that the country’s economy and livelihood are already under the weight of U.S. unilateral sanctions, and that the return of Security Council resolutions will not add significant new restrictions. Yet this view represents only half the truth. What sets the snapback mechanism apart is not merely the level of sanctions, but the international legitimacy and the legal-political consensus it builds against Iran. The return of the case to Chapter VII would be binding on many states and companies, further constraining even minimal economic cooperation and complicating informal channels.
Conversely, overstating the snapback mechanism is no less misguided or harmful than underplaying it. Experience shows that fueling an atmosphere of fear and despair can weaken internal cohesion, erode public trust, and spread a passive outlook toward international developments. Excessive exaggeration, instead of fostering rationality and diplomatic activity, may convince the public and economic actors that any effort or initiative is futile and that the country has entered an irreversible deadlock. Yet one of the main pillars of national resilience over the past two decades has been the preservation of hope and the belief in finding new solutions.
It is for this reason that senior officials have sought to send two clear messages at once: first, that the implementation of the snapback mechanism lacks legal validity and legitimacy; second, that despite this, the path of negotiation and dialogue remains open. The president, the foreign minister, and other officials have repeatedly stressed in recent weeks that Iran is ready to return to the negotiating table within the framework of national interests. Ali Larijani, as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, also underlined in a tweet that “the path of negotiation is not closed”—a message indicating that at the level of state leadership there is strong consensus on making use of diplomatic opportunities. Such positions signal to both the public and foreign parties that Iran, while standing firm on its nuclear rights, seeks dialogue and wishes to avoid a dead end.
Thus, the right way to face the snapback mechanism is neither to underestimate nor to magnify it. Underestimation prevents a proper grasp of the threat and obstructs preparations to reduce its fallout. Overstatement pushes society toward despair and inaction. The balanced approach requires realism, self-confidence, and active diplomacy.
Now more than ever, the country needs dynamic , internal cohesion, and avoidance of both oversimplification and exaggeration. The snapback mechanism is indeed a real threat, but one whose effects can be managed with prudence, intelligence, and reliance on national capacity. History shows that neither indifference to danger nor surrender to fear has ever worked. The third way—realism coupled with constructive dialogue—is the path that can safeguard Iran’s national interests in these difficult circumstances.
NOURNEWS