Nournews: The recent Israeli military strike on Iran cannot be seen simply as a local or tactical move within the long-standing Tehran–Tel Aviv conflicts. Rather, this operation took place against a backdrop of strategic, security, and personal shifts within Israel’s decision-making circles—shifts that began on October 7, 2023, after “Operation Al‑Aqsa Storm,” and have now reached a boiling point. In fact, this military move results from Israel’s adoption of a new offensive doctrine to confront mounting threats to its existence.
After the Hamas operation and its shocking impact on Israel’s security apparatus, the structural vulnerabilities of the regime in the intelligence, security, and military domains were exposed. This situation resulted in what has been described as a “strategic paralysis” within Israel’s security, intelligence, and military structure.
Consequently, a sense of incapacity to guarantee the security of the occupied territories and their inhabitants emerged, shaking the legitimacy of the government and the military. Therefore, one of the main approaches Tel Aviv adopted to restore its “broken deterrence” was to continuously strike both current and potential threats like Iran.
On the other hand, Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal decisions also played a decisive role in this crisis. He was in a critical situation: facing multiple corruption cases, domestic pressure, social protests, intelligence failures in Gaza, growing distrust within the military, and internal political strife. In such an environment, Netanyahu viewed military confrontation not as a threat but as his “only chance to survive.” War became a tool to manage domestic crises and secure his political future.
From Syria to Iran: A doctrine of continuous offense
The wide-ranging Israeli attacks on Syrian infrastructure post‑Bashar al‑Assad’s fall showed that this new offensive doctrine is not aimed exclusively at Iran—it is a general strategy against any actor with potential defensive, intelligence, or national assets that could threaten Israel. Just as the collapse of the Syrian state enabled the destruction of its military, industrial, and even security infrastructure, destabilizing countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, or even Pakistan could provide Tel Aviv with opportunities—so it believes—to eliminate regional threats before they fully mature.
Within this framework, the strike on Iran on June 13 was not impulsive or reactionary; it was planned based on a strategic window of opportunity. Israeli analysts believed that Iran—strained by recent developments in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine)—had weakened and lacked the readiness for a lightning war. This misjudgment paved the way for the operation.
The U.S. role: Ally or crisis instigator?
A key point in analyzing this episode is the role of the United States. Even if we assume the decision to strike came independently from Israel, it’s certain that it did not proceed without coordination—or at least a green light—from Washington. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has not denied this coordination, and various sources have reported U.S. logistical and intelligence support for the Israeli operation.
Trump, facing crises in Gaza, Ukraine, economic competition with China, and domestic economic stagnation, was hoping to overturn his record with a symbolic win in Iran—without incurring direct costs for Washington. For him, an Israeli strike succeeded by Iranian defeat would be a symbolic victory. But that calculation quickly fell apart.
The inverse equation of the 12‑Day war
Contrary to Tel Aviv and the White House’s expectations, not only did Iran avoid collapse under the surprise attack, but it also quickly mobilized its decision‑making and operational structure to deliver heavy blows against Israel. The destruction of Israeli intelligence, military, energy, and advanced‑industry centers—even threats to technological infrastructure in Tel Aviv—completely flipped the power equation.
Three strategic crises paralyzed Israel mid‑war:
The end of the element of surprise and the beginning of Iran’s counterattacks.
Miscalculations about domestic Iranian discontent that failed to materialize.
The breakdown of social resilience in the occupied territories, marked by the mass exodus of thousands from key areas.
In such circumstances, continuing the war meant sinking into an expensive impasse. Thus, Netanyahu asked Washington to broker a ceasefire that would allow Israel to maintain a symbolic image of victory—through a limited strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran, however, refused not only to accept such a ceasefire but also delivered a final blow to Tel Aviv—demonstrating that it would never play a passive role in regional military affairs.
Is another attack on the way?
A serious question now surfacing in strategic circles is: Will Israel strike Iran again? The answer depends on several factors:
If Tel Aviv and Washington could gain a strategic advantage from continuing the war, why halt operations after paying the initial cost? The answer is clear: prolonging the war brought no benefits and imposed heavy, irrecoverable costs.
If Israel hopes to strike again once it has rebuilt its strength, the same window also belongs to Iran. Additionally, Israel counted on surprise in the first round—only to find that Iran is now fully prepared and that any repeat would be far more difficult.
Another key consideration is whether the U.S. would allow a second strike. It’s clear that Israel cannot attack Iran again without U.S. approval. Unlike Israel—which seeks military action alone—Washington is also pursuing political avenues to achieve its goals with less cost. Regional and international diplomatic developments suggest that the U.S. is indeed attempting to employ political tools rather than military force in this increasingly complex situation. The 12‑day war demonstrated that relying on military means in a region where crises can globalize rapidly not only fails to resolve conflicts, but can also produce unpredictable outcomes—such as decisions that benefit no one.
Finally, can Israel withstand a second strike? This time, not only Tehran but its allies—with sharper understanding of the conflict—are more ready to respond. Repeating such a mistake could lead to the collapse of Israel’s internal and regional authority.
Mutual deterrence and the end of a delusion
The 12‑day war between Iran and Israel extinguished the fantasy of Israel’s absolute military superiority. It showed that a “first‑strike” doctrine, if not decisive, leads instead to a strategic dead end. Israel not only failed to revive its deterrence but also inadvertently elevated Iran to a position of deterrent power as well.
From now on, any military decision against Iran must account for new regional capabilities and a deeper understanding of Tehran’s likely responses. In today’s geopolitical context, there is neither room for error nor any escape from its consequences.
NOURNEWS