Nournews: The recent Israeli strikes on certain military and security centers within Iran have once again brought one of the most sensitive strategic questions to the forefront of public and expert discourse: How has Israel managed to access such sensitive and detailed intelligence from inside Iranian territory? Are we witnessing a classical case of espionage, or should we speak of a broader concept—infiltration? Or perhaps what is unfolding is a complex blend of both—and even more? Understanding the distinction between these two concepts is essential for accurately analyzing today’s intelligence threats against Iran. While commonly used interchangeably in public discourse, espionage and infiltration differ significantly at the conceptual, operational, and strategic levels.
What is Espionage? Who is an infiltrator?
"Espionage," in its precise definition, refers to the covert acquisition of classified information by individuals or groups affiliated with an adversary. It typically revolves around accessing, eavesdropping, photographing, or transmitting military, security, and political data. A spy might be a formal member of an enemy intelligence agency or someone recruited from within the system, motivated by money, ideology, or personal reasons.
Given past reports on modern espionage techniques—including projects like Pegasus—it is plausible to consider that the recent intelligence war involved the most sophisticated spying tactics, exploiting modern communication tools—particularly smartphones—to gather various forms of intelligence on targets.
Smartphones collect textual, audio, visual, geolocation, and even health data, as well as users’ daily schedules around the clock. They have become inseparable from daily life. Continuous use of such devices over the years may lead to the accumulation of significant big data on security and intelligence subjects and their families. Ongoing analysis of this data using artificial intelligence systems will undoubtedly provide valuable insights to foreign spy agencies—insights that, in events like the recent Israeli aggression, could be decisive in planning assassinations and enhancing precision. Notably, even if the subjects themselves don’t use such phones, use by their family members can yield the same outcomes.
In this light, it can be argued that much of the intelligence utilized by the Zionist regime during the 12-day war was obtained through modern espionage methods and new communication technologies, even though not all of their actions relied solely on this type of information.
Infiltration: Beyond espionage
In contrast, infiltration is a deeper and more dynamic process. The goal of infiltration is not merely to obtain information but to alter structures, influence decision-makers' will, and disrupt key processes within a political-social system. Infiltration can occur through formal institutions, elite circles, media, NGOs, or cultural spaces. An infiltrator may emerge not just from above but also from below—or even from within the society itself. Put simply: espionage is about knowing, while infiltration is about changing.
Beyond espionage, deeper than infiltration
When we apply this conceptual framework to recent events, it becomes clear that what took place goes beyond traditional espionage or mere infiltration. The precision of the attacks, detailed geographic knowledge, potential presence of insiders—whether human or technical—and the complicit tone of certain regional and even domestic media all point to a hybrid intelligence-psychological operation drawing on both espionage and infiltration tactics. From this perspective, Israel’s recent actions against Iran can be described as a multi-layered cognitive-infiltration war. A war in which:
Part of the mission involves gathering information and coordinates (espionage);
Another part seeks to penetrate key structures and individuals (infiltration);
And yet another part aims to undermine the state’s perceived security efficiency and spread a sense of insecurity among the public through psychological and media operations.
U.S. and Israeli investment in invisible wars
A realistic analysis of these threats must acknowledge the extensive capabilities and experience of the U.S. and Israel in planning and executing intelligence-infiltration operations. For decades, these actors have heavily invested in developing cognitive warfare strategies, covert operations, and structural penetration of target environments.
Israel, through units like Unit 8200 (in signal and cyber intelligence) and Mossad (in human infiltration), possesses some of the region’s most advanced intelligence networks. Operations such as the assassination of nuclear scientists, sabotage of industrial facilities, or precision strikes on sensitive targets would be impossible without a sophisticated network of cyber spying, ground operatives, and behavioral analysis from within Iranian society.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has developed a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond espionage. It combines intelligence, media, cultural, academic, diplomatic, and economic tools to corrode the internal structure of target nations. According to U.S. national security doctrine, defeating rival systems doesn’t necessarily require military force—it can be done by targeting decision-making layers, legitimacy, public perception, and dominant narratives.
Allocated budgets for hybrid warfare, the design of think tanks and policy institutes, and the networking of cultural, political, and academic elites all suggest that these powers view perception warfare as a proactive strategy and a form of indirect deterrence. In effect, the U.S. and Israel are less interested in ground warfare and more focused on shaping the battlefield inside their opponents’ minds—a battlefield where every disclosure, media gap, security doubt, or careless domestic narrative counts as a victory for the enemy.
The need for complementary policies in intelligence warfare
In this context, mere technical countermeasures—such as monitoring entry points, revising cybersecurity, or cleansing institutions—are not enough. Infiltration warfare demands a structural and holistic approach: identifying vulnerable institutions, increasing transparency in decision-making processes, and improving the security literacy of political and cultural elites. Today’s adversary is not merely after maps and documents—they aim to influence how we prioritize, decide, and even collectively narrate our reality.
Crucially, the recent operation did not come solely from outside. Some internal circles—knowingly or unknowingly—also played a role in amplifying the enemy's message: from analyses that mocked the country's security capabilities to narratives that, deliberately or otherwise, pointed fingers at domestic institutions. This, too, is part of the hybrid war: internal actors amplifying the psychological impact of external operations.
A strategic crossroads
Iran now stands at a critical juncture. Intelligence threats are no longer defined merely by leaks or wiretapping—but by manipulation of meaning, disruption of perception, and erosion of public trust. Under these conditions, distinguishing between espionage and infiltration—and crafting distinct and complementary policies to counter each—is an urgent strategic necessity.
Ultimately, the recent experience shows that the battlefield of the future will not be defined by drones and missiles, but by decisions, perceptions, and narratives. If the enemy finds a foothold in our minds and domestic discourse, it no longer needs physical infiltration. Thus, reinforcing the system’s soft defenses, reconfiguring the country’s communication structures, and cleansing institutions from within has become even more vital. This war will not be won merely through information or inspections—it requires a deep understanding of the hidden nature of the threat and a measured, structural response.
NOURNEWS