While Iran can still remain within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it must recognize a critical truth: nuclear security is derived from “rights,” but it is sustained through “power.”
At dawn, when American bombs and missiles struck Fordow and Natanz, a bitter truth was laid bare for the world: membership in the NPT and adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s regulations brought Iran neither immunity nor legitimacy. For years, Iran endured the most rigorous inspections and submitted transparent reports in an effort to gain international trust in its peaceful nuclear program. Yet, what ultimately happened was a blatant attack on nuclear facilities under the agency’s supervision.
The pressing question now is: when the international legal framework fails, through what mechanisms should Iran secure and exercise its nuclear rights?
Legitimacy Crisis of the NPT: From Promises to Reality
The NPT was built on three key pillars:
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament of nuclear-armed states, and most importantly, the inalienable right of member states to peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Iran, one of the treaty’s earliest signatories, has consistently emphasized the third pillar. Yet in practice, it has been met with sanctions, threats, assassinations of scientists, industrial sabotage, and even military strikes. In such circumstances, the NPT has ceased to be a protective mechanism for Iran’s rights and instead become a tool for unilateral control, coercion, and interference by global powers.
In light of this, Iran must adopt a realistic yet principled approach and consider activating the following options:
A) Reassessment of NPT Membership:
Under Article X of the treaty, any member state may legally withdraw if it deems its national interests are seriously threatened, provided it gives three months’ notice. Such a withdrawal is legitimate and legal—and contrary to Western propaganda, it does not equate to pursuing nuclear weapons. Instead, it could serve as a political lever for redefining Iran’s relationship with the global non-proliferation system.
B) Strengthening Cooperation with Regional and Non-Western Organizations: Given the erosion of trust in institutions dominated by Western powers, Iran can expand its scientific and technical cooperation with Russia, China, India, Latin American countries, and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Through South–South diplomacy, Iran could help form a new bloc of states that challenge the current global non-proliferation order.
C) Active Legal Deterrence: Rather than defensively responding to Western accusations, Iran should take legal action against violators of its rights: file formal complaints against Israel for cyber and military attacks, bring a case against the U.S. at the International Court of Justice for its direct assault on Iranian territory, and pursue legal and media strategies to expose the ’s double standards.
D) Gradual and Transparent Technical Development: Unlike some nations, Iran can advance its technical capabilities—whether in enrichment, reactor development, or nuclear fuel production—through a clear but firm path, without submitting to discriminatory obligations.
Again, this is a world no longer governed by treaties, but by power balances, alliances, and strong national will. Iran can still operate within the NPT framework, but it must understand: nuclear security comes from “rights,” but it is safeguarded by “power.” If legitimacy through international instruments is eroded, it must be reclaimed through resilient diplomacy, smart deterrence, and coalition-building. Perhaps the time has come for Iran to transition from a passive role to a proactive, strategic actor in reshaping the global non-proliferation regime—in defense of its rightful nuclear entitlements.
NOURNEWS