Nournews: The recent comments by the senior Omani diplomat regarding Iran’s role in the region deserve careful attention.
Badr al-Busaidi, Oman’s Foreign Minister, speaking at a panel during the annual Manama Dialogue hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Bahrain, highlighted that “the time has come for a serious reassessment of regional policies and the positions of states toward Iran.”
The tone and context of his remarks suggested that the 12-day war and the conduct of both Iran and Israel during that conflict have had a decisive influence on this new and unprecedented stance. Such a discursive transformation in the region holds the potential to reshape the security and strategic arrangements of the Persian Gulf states.
A shift in regional attitudes toward Iran
As Al-Busaidi himself noted, Persian Gulf Arab countries—particularly after the Islamic Revolution—have long viewed Iran as an actual or potential threat. They assumed that Iran sought to export its revolution to the entire world, especially to its neighbors. Consequently, they tended, openly or covertly, toward policies aimed at containing Iran—policies that were strongly encouraged by Western powers sowing division in the region.
However, Israel’s unjustified and blatant attacks on Iran during the recent 12-day conflict, along with its missile strike on central Qatar, have changed public perceptions in the region toward Tel Aviv’s policymakers. One of the main factors behind this shift has been Iran’s calculated and intelligent responses to Israeli and American aggressions.
Oman’s foreign minister explicitly stated that the policy of containing Iran has failed and has only further complicated the region’s security environment.
From Oman’s perspective, Iran can and should be an effective partner in establishing regional stability and security—rather than a threat that must be restrained.
This shift in Arab attitudes toward Iran has become particularly evident following Israel’s recent attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.
A similar position was previously voiced by Prince Turki al-Faisal, the influential Saudi statesman and former intelligence chief. He stated that “if justice truly prevailed in the world, we would witness U.S. B-2 bombers striking Dimona and other Israeli nuclear sites,” since Israel—not Iran—possesses a nuclear arsenal, is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and remains outside IAEA oversight.
He further noted that those who justify Israeli attacks on Iran by citing certain Iranian officials’ statements about “erasing Israel” often ignore that Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has repeatedly—since 1996—called for “the overthrow of the Iranian government.”
These remarks clearly point to a profound rhetorical and strategic turn in Arab regional policies toward Iran.
Oman’s foreign minister meaningfully stressed that:
“Refusing constructive and honest engagement with Iran and other regional actors will not solve problems such as proxy wars, human suffering, or nuclear proliferation. On the contrary, exclusion and isolation only inflame conflicts, extremism, and instability, thereby worsening these very challenges. Only a comprehensive regional security framework can effectively address our shared challenges by pooling collective resources and paving the way for a more stable and prosperous future for our nations.”
Challenges to the Abraham Accords and U.S.-Israeli goals
It appears that Al-Busaidi’s use of the term “comprehensive regional security framework” can be seen as a subtle but firm rejection of the U.S.-Israeli “Abraham Accords,” through which Washington and Tel Aviv seek to persuade—or even pressure—Arab and Muslim countries into normalization. His remarks therefore pose a serious challenge to this strategic project.
The Abraham Accords, designed to normalize Israel’s relations with Arab states in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, are fundamentally built on forming a united front against Iran.
For these accords to succeed, Iran must be framed as a regional threat. Arab states, in turn, are expected to bear economic and political costs for normalization in the name of confronting “Iranian aggression.” Prior to the 12-day war and even before October 7 and the start of the Gaza conflict, Israel sought to advance this agenda through its “gray-zone warfare” strategy—buying security at minimal cost while expanding its influence and normalization outreach in the Persian Gulf.
Yet the current regional dynamics—especially after recent developments—show that both the “gray-zone” strategy and the Abraham Accords face major obstacles.
Israel’s attacks on Iran have prompted many regional states to reassess its destabilizing behavior.
In particular, the recent Israeli strikes on Qatar, which underscored the regime’s disregard for Arab sovereignty, have led many countries to view partnership with Iran as a more viable and strategic path toward regional stability than alignment with Israel.
In response to these developments, Iran has managed—through a blend of military deterrence and active diplomacy—not only to thwart U.S.-Israeli designs on the military front, but also to strengthen its diplomatic standing among Persian Gulf Arab states.
Iran’s prudent policy of restraint and balanced engagement has earned it a reputation as a reliable partner for regional security and stability.
Tehran has effectively conveyed the message that it can serve as a strong barrier against Israeli expansionism while assuring its neighbors that any hostile actions will only lead to deeper crises.
Accordingly, in light of these developments, both the Abraham Accords project and U.S.-Israeli strategies in the Middle East now face serious challenges.
For the Persian Gulf states, Iran is increasingly seen not as a threat to be contained, but as a strategic and trustworthy partner in ensuring regional stability.
Iran’s diplomatic and security approach has demonstrably influenced regional perceptions and created new opportunities for cooperation.
Projects aimed at isolating Iran, particularly amid recent tensions, now face uncertainty—and possibly deadlock. These transformations will directly impact the region’s political and security equations.
It is therefore essential for Iran’s strategic policymakers to recognize this discursive transformation in the region and to take decisive steps to consolidate and sustain it, turning these early signs into a lasting and far-reaching regional reality.